Economic Interests and Lobbying in the Early Weimar Republic: Holtzendorffs Political Salon by Buse, D.
Economic Interests and Lobbying 
in the Early Weimar Republic: 
Holtzendorffs Political Salon* 
by D. K. BusE** 
Lobbying to defend interests or to affect public policy has become a 
norm of political and economic life in most industrialized countries. Special 
pleading through briefs, bribery , contributions to political parties or detail-
ed reports by experts are among the many mechanisms developed by 
lobbyists. A lesser known and perhaps less frequently utilized means is 
the creation of a salon or discussion circle. This means was utilized by one 
of Germany's largest shipping firms during and after World War I. An 
examination of the lobbying undertaken through that salon provides an 
opportunity to re-examine the relationship between big business and the 
state in the context of the early Weimar Republic. While historians have 
frequently presented business as the dynamic factor, and the state as the 
static factor in the relationship, the new documents on which this essay is 
based suggest a dual dynamism: the documents illustrate a "transfer 
mechanism" by which the influence of economic interests finds expression 
in the political sphere as well as showing how such interest groups can 
become tied to a state and help stabilize it. Further, these materials pro-
vide insight into the interaction among German elites, especially co-
operation among elite groups with divergent interests. 
In one of the few public references_ to the salon in question, the 
German liberal publicist Ernst Jackh attributed extensive influence to a 
so-called Holtzendorff-Tisch (Holtzendorff round table). According to 
Jackh, 
every chancellor, every minister, every party leader ... the leading economists 
and intellectuals, everyone who held a significant post met there with each 
other, not all together, but varying ... preferably eight in number ... There 
many appointments and institutions were decided upon. 1 
Jackh cited some letters and documents to support his claims. He mention-
ed other salons but in his estimation, "personally and politically the most 
influential among round tables was that of Holtzendorff''. 2 Though a con-
* The author completed this project with financial support from the Alexander 
von Humboldt Stiftung, Bonn. All translations are by the author. 
** Department of History, Laurentian University, Sudbury . 
1 E . JACKH, Der goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltburgers (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt, 1954), pp. 189-90. 
z Ibid., p. 189. 
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temporary could leave such a large hint for historians, little has been written 
about this salon because the firm's archives relating to them have not 
generally been opened to researchers. The activities of Arndt von Holt-
zendorlf, the lobbyist of the Hamburg-Amerikanische-Paketfahrt-Aktien-
Gesellschaft (Hapag) can only be traced through those papers. 3 
The man who ran the discussion circles remains an elusive character. 
Holtzendorlf (1859-1935) grew up in a cultivated aristocratic family. He 
received the thorough education in select schools that provided his class 
with social grace and command of languages. Having studied law he start-
ed a career in the army and then served as private secretary to the Princess 
Frederick, the wife of the Hohenzollern Prince who reigned as Kaiser 
for a hundred days in 1888. A brother, Hennig, with whom he remained 
on close personal terms while diverging politically , attained the rank of 
Grossadmiral and became known for his outspoken support of Admiral 
Tirpitz's expansionist programme. A nephew, as undersecretary in the 
British Foreign Office, provided ties to Britain and a niece was married to 
another relative of this undersecretary. In 1898 Holtzendorlf obtained a 
directorship in the Hapag and undertook public relations for the firm , 
eventually becoming a confidant of Albert Ballin, the firm's general di-
rector. From 1914 until his retirement in 1924 he worked in Berlin as the 
political informant, social organizer and main lobbyist of the Hapag. He 
served on the Presidium of the Hansa-Bund fiir Handel, Gewerbe und 
Industrie (Hansa-League for Trade and Industry), was a director of the 
German Auslandsinstitut (German Institute for Foreign Affairs) and the 
German Zundholzfabrikanten (German Match-makers Federation). He kept 
the Hapag directorate in Hamburg well informed on the political workings 
of the German state through a stream of very detailed reports. A photo-
graph from 1919 shows Holtzendorlf as an immaculately groomed man 
with the demeanour of an elderly, friendly uncle, holding his cigar in a 
refined but relaxed manner. Always the polite and engaging host, he had 
made a name for himself during the World War with his political salon. 
At first his reputation had been current primarily among the Berlin military, 
3 The materials are from the Hapag Archiv , Hamburg and were made available by 
Rolf Finck, Information Office , Hapag-Lloyd , to whom the author is very grateful. The origi-
nal sources will hereafter be cited as Holtzendorff or Cuno collections with file numbers . 
The numbering system on the files in their loose-leaf binders usually contains reference to 
the two files per binder, and hence the two numbers in the references below. The docu-
ments are mainly type-written originals or carbons with some handwritten additions. Lamar 
CECIL employed parts of this collection for his biography Albert Ballin: Business and 
Politics in Imperial Germany 1888-1918 (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967). In 
his bibliography, especially, pp. 357-59, he has provided a convenient survey of the 
Holtzendorff documents, including their gaps. But a further clarification is necessary . The 
documents Cecil cites as Holtzendorff-B contain original reports by Holtzendorff to Ballin 
and carbons of Ballin's letters and instructions to Holtzendorff for the period 1914-18. 
They were previously in the Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin and are now located 
in Koblenz, Bundesarchiv (hereafter BA) collection R 1/1-16. The documents which Cecil 
cites as Holtzendorff- A are carbons and some originals in possession of the Hapag Archiv, 
Hamburg. They extend beyond 1918, are somewhat in disarray and much richer than Cecil's 
remarks would suggest. Cecil only employed the materials up to 1918 as did F. ZuNKEL, 
Indu strie und Staatssozialismus (Dusseldorf : Droste Verlag , 1974) , pp. 109, 151-55, who 
employed the Bundesarchiv collection. 
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commercial and bureaucratic elite which had spent long hours enjoying 
his firm's generosity. By the end of the World War, in keeping with German 
political trends, he widened the circle to include some bourgeois and 
Social Democratic leaders. 4 
Holtzendorff's role and his reports to Hapag headquarters in Ham-
burg were to be much more significant for the period of the Weimar Re-
public than during the war. Despite his access to influential figures in the 
government and the administration, Holtzendorff remained a listener on 
the outside of decision-making events during the war. This may have 
been due to the Hapag's interest in an accommodation with Britain and 
the United States or the Hapag general director's mild stance on territorial 
annexations when the military and heavy industry successfully favoured a 
policy of aggressive war aims. Probably Holtzendorffs limited role was 
due to Ballin, the general director who personally oversaw his shipping 
line's affairs, and who controlled Holtzendorff as his medium while re-
serving for himself direct access to the really significant persons such as 
the Kaiser. After Ballin died in November 1918 Holtzendorff was on equal 
footing with the other Hapag directors, especially the new general di-
rector, Wilhelm Cuno. Holtzendorff could now act on his own initiative 
rather than merely. follow instructions. A corresponding change of tone is 
evident in the Holtzendorff reports after November 1918. 5 In addition to 
these personal circumstances, the crucial role of shipping and commerce 
during the armistice and peace-making period when the new German 
government frantically sought the aid of commercial experts with contacts 
to the international financial community and also sought to resolve the 
problem of transporting food supplies, enhanced Holtzendorff's and the 
Hapag's position after 1918. 6 
One of the reasons so little became known about the councils con-
vened by Holtzendorff was his reluctance to accept public posts. For 
instance, he rejected the Reich President's offer to become chief of protocol 
during February 1919. 7 Another pertinent reason was that the round-table 
participants who came from opposing political parties and represented a 
wide range of institutions could hardly reveal that they frequented com-
promising private sessions with their supposed "opponents". Finally, 
Holtzendorff wrote no memoirs and his reports remained secret. 8 
4 The following provide information on Holtzendorff: Reichs Handbuch der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft, 2 vols (Berlin: Deutscher Wirtschaftsverlag, 1931), I: 793; Ernst 
ScHROEDER, "Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter der Weimarer Republik", in 
Beitriige zur Geschichte von Stadt und Stift Essen, 86 (1971): 220; CECIL, Albert Ballin, p. 249, 
describes Holtzendorff as a "cherubic, demilitarized Hindenburg". On the question of con-
tacts to the SPD see BA, R I/16, reports of October 1918, especially 29 October 1918. 
s For example, compare BA, R I/13 reports of July 1917 with those cited below. 
6 The fullest account is Leo HAUPTS, Deutsche Friedenspolitik /9/8-/9: Eine 
Alternative zur Machtpolitik des Erst en Weltkrieges? (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1976), pp. 183ff. 
7 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 28 February 1919; JA:cKH, Goldene 
Pflug, p. 189. 
8 Other possible sources on the Holtzendorff sessions are difficult to find. From 
among the most frequent participants, Ebert and Schiffer, the papers of the former were 
destroyed (see Die Zeit, 7 March 1975, p. 9) while Schiffer's diary-memoirs contain 
occasional references to the Holtzendorff contact without substance (BA, Schiffer Nachlass, 
A "Memoiren" 4, 550). 
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Holtzendorff received an occasional laudatory reference in the 
memoirs of the Weimar Republic's leading individuals. The long-time 
Minister of Defence, Otto Gessler, "fondly remembered" the political 
salon. 9 More informative, and illustrating that the Hapag representative 
provided more than pleasant gatherings, was a statement by Hans Luther, 
Minister of Finance and Reich Chancellor: 
During the course of creating the cabinet, Cuno [Chancellor from November 
1922 to August 1923] asked me to visit him in late November [1922]. The meet-
ing took place in the rooms of the Hapag. Their Berlin representative, Admiral 
[sic] von Holtzendorff, had long understood how to organize modest gather-
ings in these rooms, where he brought together personalities of differing po-
litical viewpoints, even the Reich President and other leading Social Democrats 
with decisive German Nationalists. 10 
Gustav Noske, Miriister of Defence before Gessler, noted that he had 
been Holtzendorff's guest on the night (31 May 1919) that the body of Rosa 
Luxemburg was discovered. From there he had no qualms giving orders 
to dispose of her corpse. Most instructive, though, are Noske's statements 
on a later gathering: 
On 14 April 1921 I was invited to a Herrenabend by Director Holt-
zendorff. In particular the question of rebuilding the Prussian cabinet was 
discussed ... the individual ministers too were considered. Raumer [Minister 
of Finance, a leading manager of an industrial trade association and German 
People's Party member] offered to look up Labour Minister Brauns, who had 
already left the meeting ... Brauns would then convince Stegerwald [a leading 
Catholic trade unionist]. That had to be done systematically. Next day at noon 
when Stegerwald came to Ebert, with whom I was invited to dine, he pre-
sented Schiffer's [a leading Democratic Party member and former Finance 
Minister] arguments as his own and mentioned the names which had been 
proposed as ministers during the previous evening. II 
Noske's revelation that political decisions were hammered out at the 
Herrenabende (club sessions) appears to cast a different light on these 
sessions. 
The authors who have concentrated upon the relations between 
industry-finance and politics in the Weimar era rarely mentioned the Ha-
pag's lobbying or political involvements. 12 An exception is a documentary 
9 Otto GESSLER, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1958), p. 420. 
10 Hans LUTHER, Politiker ohne Partei: Erinnerungen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1960), pp. 90-91; Luther confused the Hapag director Arndt with his brother 
the admiral Hennig. See also H. LuTHER, "Zusammenbruch und Jahre nach dem ersten 
Krieg in Essen", Beitriige zur Geschichte von Stadt und Stift Essen, 73 (1958): 18. 
11 Gustav NOSKE, Erlebtes aus Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Demokratie 
(Offenbach: Bollwerk, 1947), pp. 85, 202. The conversation's contents are confirmed, almost 
in identical words, in Holtzendorff V and VI, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 15 April 1921. 
12 For example, a conference devoted to the interrelationship between politics and 
the industrial system of Weimar took no notice of Holtzendorff and hardly any of the 
Hapag or shipping industry. The proceedings were published as H. MoMMSEN, D. PETZINA, 
B. WEISBROD, eds, lndustrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik 
(DUsseldorf: Droste, 1974). For the Hapag's activities during World War I compare ZuNKEL, 
lndustrie, pp. 109ff and G. D. FELDMAN, "German Business Between War and Revolution: 
The Origins of the Stinnes-Legien Agreement", in Entstehung und Wandel der modernen 
Gesellschaft, ed.: G. A. RITTER (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), pp. 318, 321, with HAUPTS, 
Deutsche Friedenspolitik, pp . liOff. 
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study on Otto Wiedfeldt, a Krupp director, German ambassador to the 
United States and a frequent candidate for cabinet posts. 13 In that docu-
mentary collection Ernst Schroeder presented telegrams which show that 
General von Seeckt asked Wiedfeldt to participate in an authoritarian 
directory. This offer to replace the national government during November 
192~ went through Holtzendorff and the Hapag with the approval of the 
Reich President. Schroeder wanted to exonerate Wiedfeldt by illustrating 
that Seeckt proposed a "small cabinet with directory characteristics and 
with emergency powers" at Ebert's express wish but that Wiedfeldt cate-
gorically refused to participate. 14 Why were such significant matters of 
state entrusted to a Berlin lobbyist? How had he obtained such a position 
of confidence in ruling circles? Was it due to his frequent Herrenabende 
and how were the interests of the Hapag represented by a man so involv-
ed in the affairs of state? Schroeder ventured an estimate on Holtzendorff 
and his political endeavours: "In German politics under Ebert he was not 
exactly a grey eminence, but he did function as an influential adviser 
behind the scenes." 15 What made his salon different than others might be 
worth exploring. 
Little attention has been paid to political salons, their role in lobbying 
or their effect on the governmental system in Weimar Germany. A variety 
of such regularized gatherings operated in Berlin but the great majority 
were of the "cocktail-with-prominent-people" variety. Some were huge 
lecture and discussion sessions, a type which had become popular during 
the war. 16 This genre included the Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914 (German 
Society of 1914) which had a very large membership (over 900) that en-
compassed varied industrialists, intellectuals, military leaders and bour-
geois politicians. This society, headed by Wilhelm Solf, Minister for 
Colonies, was supposed to provide a place for discussion and exchange of 
views. The government encouraged it as a means of keeping alive the 
nationalistic and unitary "spirit of 1914". The members met in a large 
house purchased for the society's use by Robert Bosch, the automobile 
electronics magnate, who hoped that the formal lectures and informal 
discussions would bridge political gaps from the Conservatives to the 
Social Democrats and sectarian interests from big business to trade unions. 
By 1917, however, this forum served primarily as a meeting place for those 
supporting Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's war aims and tactics. 17 
13 ScHROEDER, "Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker", especially p. 219. 
14 Ernest ScHROEDER, "Wiedfeldt und die Seeckt-Ebertschen Direktoriums-pUine 
des Jahres 1923", in Das Munster am Hellweg, XIX (November 1966) : 136-37. 
15 ScHROEDER, "Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker", p. 220. 
16 The fullest accounts of German political salons are in D. FRICKE, ed., Die 
biirgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland (Berlin: Europiiisches Buch, 1968-70), especially the 
entries under "Mittwochabend (Delbriick)", "Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914", "Mittwochgesell-
schaft (Basserrnann-Stein)". For the wartime efforts of these groups see the short essay by 
G. ScHMIDT, "Biirgerliche Klubs und staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus im ersten Welt-
krieg", in Monopole und Staat in Deutschland 1917-1945 (Berlin: Akademie, 1966), pp. 69-77, 
who cites most of the pertinent literature. For the Weimar era a general survey is 
H. WIEDMULLER, "Die Berliner Gesellschaft in der Weimarer Republik" (Ph.D. dissertation. 
Freie Universitiit Berlin, 1956). His focus is upon "high society" and his references to the 
Holtzendorff salon inaccurate (pp. 44-45). 
17 J . ScHELLENBERG, "Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914", in Biirgerliche Parteien, ed.: 
FRICKE, pp. 378-80. 
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The membership of the Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914 overlapped with 
other circles and salons, in particular the Mittwochabend (Wednesday 
Evening) initiated by Delbriick. This group was kept to approximately 
twenty members who would occasionally invite guests to their discussions 
of public affairs. Some participants came from finance and industry, but the 
majority were conservative and liberal political leaders who favoured what 
had been termed a policy of "liberalized imperialism", that is indirect 
hegemony through economic control over neighbouring states coupled with 
internal reforms. This group tried to influence government policy through 
position papers and select invitations to cabinet ministers. 18 
Another salon which also sought to influence governmental policy by 
drawing together representatives from industry, finance, the political 
parties and the ministerial bureaucracy was the Mittwoch-Gesellschaft 
(Wednesday Society) initiated by Bassermann-Stein. This group, which 
expanded to nearly fifty members of primarily right-wing parties and elites 
from bureaucratic and military circles advocated the extreme war aims of 
heavy industry and the military surrounding General von Ludendorff. 
Though they opened their weekly sessions to divergent views and invited 
an occasional liberal or socialist, they formed a close-knit group. 19 
These salons attempted to appear to be above party politics but in 
practice the leadership of each sought to use the gatherings more for in-
doctrination or preaching to the converted than exchanging views. After 
a few years the participants tended to represent a fairly unitary outlook. 
By contrast, the smaller political clubs, like the Herrenklub (Gentlemen's 
Club) comprised of aristocrats and select officers made no pretence of 
including persons of other viewpoints or social backgrounds. 20 Similarly, 
the political Left had at least two clubs in which mostly Independent Social- · 
ist leaders (Simon) and trade-union officials (Sassenbach) participated. 21 
A close_ look at the composition and activities of Holtzendorff's salon 
indicates that only he brought together a manageable although extensive 
set of politically and socially significant figures. 
Allegedly, Holtzendorff established his round rable at the advice of 
Ernst Jackh who had operated a similar institution financed by Robert 
Bosch, the auto parts manufacturer. 22 Ballin encouraged this method of 
gathering approximately eight to ten individuals every few weeks to gain 
information on political developments and to affect industrial-financial 
policy. 23 The Holtzendorff-Tisch existed from early in the World War 
18 W. GuTSCHE, "Mittwochabend (Delbriick)", in ibid., pp . 330-34. 
19 B. MEISSNER, "Mittwochgesellschaft (Bassermann-Stein)", in ibid., pp. 335-37. 
2o G. FELDBAUER, "Deutscher Herrenldub", in ibid . , pp. 463-68 and compare entry 
"Nationalldub". 
21 See WIEDMULLER, "Berliner Gesellschaft", pp. 34-35 and Sassenbach's memoirs 
in typescript at Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Archiv, Dusseldorf. 
22 Claimed by JACKH, Goldene Pflug, pp. 189, 195. 
23 CECIL, Albert Ballin, pp. 252-53 . In reporting on the arrangements for one 
Herrenabend Holtzendorff wrote that he had invited some parliamentarians, government 
members "and gentlement to whom we are indebted in the Foreign Office, War Ministry 
and General Staff'' (BA, R 1/13, report of 4 July 1917). 
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until the beginning of 1924. The Social Democrat, Ebert, who had been 
invited to a session during the last days of the Empire, apparently re-
quested that such a meeting-place, where issues and opinions could be 
freely debated, be kept available. 24 Thus the Herrenabende continued 
from November 1918 through January 1919 as if oblivious to the tre-
mendous turmoil shaking the German state. In February 1919 Holtzen-
dorff moved his gatherings to Weimar where the National -Assembly and 
government deliberated. On 27 February 1919 he reviewed his activities 
and concluded: "I believe that these H errenabende in Weimar have 
proven themselves a very useful arrangement just as in Berlin." 25 By then 
the pattern for who participated in the postwar sessions had been establish-
ed. 
Six types of individuals - according to institutional afffiiation -
attended the discussions from late 1918 to early 1924: representatives of 
industry-finance (Gwinner, Rathenau, Warburg, Cuno, Raumer, Schacht); 
bourgeois leaders of the liberal and Catholic parties (Schiffer, Naumann, 
Dernburg, Petersen, Gessler, Erzberger, Koch, Brauns, Stresemann, 
Luther); the administrative and diplomatic elite (Solf, Simons, Langwerth, 
Rantzau, Albert , Haniel, Meissner, Lucius, Maltzan, Hamm); the military 
(Oertzen, Trotha, Groener, Seeckt, Schleicher); intellectuals-technocrats 
(Francke, Jackh, Freytag, Colsman, Eckener, Koeth); and moderate or 
right-wing Social Democrats (Ebert, Baake, Rauscher, Siidekum, Noske, 
Hermann Muller, Heine, Bauer). 26 Persons representing what was to 
establish itself as the political "middle" in Weimar made up the bulk of 
the membership. 27 Only two of the decisive power factors in Weimar's 
complex system were conspicuously unrepresented: heavy industry and 
the trade unions. Their absence is not surprising since heavy industry 
(with few exceptions) sided with the political Right, and the trade unions 
at least in the early postwar years tended towards the far Left. 28 Further, 
these groups had their own form of co-operation and interest representa-
tion in the Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (Central Working Community of the 
German commercial and industrial employers and employees). 29 This 
24 J ACKH, Goldene Pflug, p. 191, has confused the issue because Holtzendorff's 
round table did not cease with Ballin's death. 
25 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 27 February 1919. 
26 Some individuals could fit into more than one category. A methodological note: 
though this essay focuses only on Holtzendorff's round table for the years 1918-20 the 
composition here shown is for the period 1918-24 to illustrate shifts and continuity of 
membership. 
27 Compare the use of the term "middle" as employed by L. E. JoNES, "'The 
Dying Middle': Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation of Bourgeois Politics", Central 
European History , V (1972): 23-31 and the more accurate term "parliamentary center" used 
by C. S. MAIER, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in 
the Decade after World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 227ff. 
28 See H. PoTTHOFF, Gewerkschaften und Politik zwischen Revolution und Inflation 
(DUsseldorf: Droste, 1979), esp. pp. 66ff. Another reason the union leadership might 
have been absent is because until the end of the World War workers in the shipping industry 
had hardly been unionized . 
29 On the industrialists ' primacy in this working partnership see the studies of G. D. 
FELDMAN now resumed in his Iron and Steel in the German Inflation 1916-1923 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 82ff. 
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institutionalized set of written agreements between big business and 
industry took the form of negotiations between equals and set them apart 
from the salons. The composition of Holtzendorff's round table makes it 
appear to have been a means by which a sector of commerce, with-ties 
to light industry, sought to influence political figures. 
In Holtzendorff's reports on his round tables, a politician's name 
appears almost simultaneously with that individual's appointment to a 
cabinet post or significant position. The disappearance of a name, too, 
coincides with his loss of authority. For instance, the diplomat Solf, who 
acted as secretary for foreign affairs in November and early December 
1918,- participated during December 1918 and January 1919. Similarly, 
Baake, Simons and Albert, who held decisive posts as undersecretaries 
in the Chancellery, participated during their time in office and then disap-
peared. Schiffer dropped out in 1921 to be replaced by Brauns and Raumer 
while Stresemann and Luther joined in 1923, almost paralleling their rising 
or falling fortunes in party or state. From the military, Groener, a frequent 
participant during 1919-20, gave way to Seeckt, who remained until the 
end of 1923. Among the Social Democrats, Siidekum's last mention is 
1920, Heine's and Noske's 1921, while Hermann Miiller remained from 
mid-1919 through 1923. A similar pattern appears for the liberals, in that 
Dernburg left in 1919 but Gessler remained a constant after November 
1919. 
A review of the early Weimar cabinets and top posts in the Chancel-
lery and Foreign Office reveals that only a few names are missing from 
those who attended Holtzendorff' s circle during their periods in power. 
Most evident are the trade-union cabinet members (Wissell, Schlicke, 
Giesberts). With the exception of Brauns and Erzberger, the Catholic 
Centre Party's leaders such as Fehrenbach, Wirth, Bell and Hermes never 
seem to have participated. The most frequent attenders were Ebert and 
Schiffer. Gessler, Hermann Miiller, Noske, Albert, Groener, Seeckt and 
Warburg were frequent guests. Baake, Jackh, Naumann, Rantzau, Simons, 
Solf and Oertzen participated fairly frequently. 30 
Holtzendorff usually reported to the Hapag directory the day after 
the Herrenabende. Three of his reports will be summarized to illustrate 
the type of information sent and the format Holtzendorff employed. On 
18 December 1918 Holtzendorff sent a four-page type-written report, by 
special delivery and registered mail, to the board of the Hapag for the 
attention of its managing director, Cuno. Holtzendorff mentioned he was 
enclosing a letter from the Swiss Embassy in the United States forwarded 
by the German Foreign Office. After this business matter concerning the 
sale of Hapag ships detained in the United States, Holtzendorff wrote: 
Yesterday I invited to my Herrenabend here : 
Excellency State Secretary Schiffer [responsible for finances] , 
Mr Ebert, People's Commissar [head of the provisional government], 
Undersecretary Baake [from the Chancellery], 
30 Since the documents are incomplete no statistical accounting was attempted on 
guest frequency. 
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Excellency State Secretary Solf [foreign affairs], 
Professor Dr Francke [member of the socialization commission], 
Major von Oertzen [general staff member, head of a Free Corps unit], 
Professor Dr Jackh [liberal publicist], 
Dr Friedrich Naumann [Democratic Party chairman], 
Dr Reuss [editor of Deutsche Politik], 
Mr Ulrich Rauscher [press aide in the Chancellery], 
Ministerial director Dr Simons [from the Chancellery]. 
Unfortunately Ebert, Baake and Rauscher declined at the last minute because 
yesterday evening a cabinet session with the supreme workers' and soldiers' 
council, called due to the unrest a day earlier, had lasted until past midnight. 31 
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After listing who had been invited and who actually attended, Holtzen-
dorff usually reported the general discussions, specific issues on which 
conclusions had been reached or opinion formulated. Holtzendorff' s re-
port normally took the form of minutes on the exchanges between three 
or four persons. In this instance, Holtzendorff reported his discussion with 
Schiffer. He had informed Schiffer of the coal magnate Hugo Stinnes' 
opinion that the Entente would place extensive financial controls on every-
thing which belonged to the German state while leaving private property 
uncontrolled. Stinnes had therefore proposed an attempt not to let the 
finance ministry implement the tax measures introduced during the revo-
lution. Schiffer suggested that the peace conditions would have to be 
implemented before he could take a stance. "It appeared to me, though, 
as if he were prepared in principle to consider the matter", Holtzendorff 
concluded. With Francke Holtzendorff discussed the same matter and 
asked him to point out to the socialization commission "how dangerous 
it was right now to increase the state's value by taking over private pro-
perty". The two conversations obviously represent attempts to influence 
political decisions in a direction consistent with the ideological preferences 
and financial interests of the possessors of war gains or large-scale pro-
perty. 
Holtzendorff continued by reviewing the main discussion topic of 
the evening, the counter-revolutionary putsch of 6 December inspired by 
underlings of the Foreign Office staff. All agreed that this incident had 
hurt the moderate elements in the provisional government. In particular, 
Ebert's attempt to obtain a mandate for early elections at the Allgemeiner 
Kongress der Arbeiter-und Soldatenrate Deutschlands (General Congress 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in Germany) had been harmed, though 
the salon members assumed that large demonstrations by workers could 
be held in check. Holtzendorff also reported that the government had 
publicly admitted through posters that the counter-revolutionary putsch 
had originated in the Foreign Office in order to take the wind out of its 
opponents' sails by depriving them of agitation material. 
31 This resume is based on a report by Holtzendorff to the Hapag directory, 8 De-
cember 1918 (Holtzendorff I and II). Background information on the items discussed is 
readily available in such studies as A. J. RYDER, The German Revolution of 1918 (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), S. MILLER and G. A. RITTER, eds, Die deutsche 
Revolution 1918-1919 (Frankfurt: Campe und Hoffmann, 1968) or S. MILLER and H. PoTTHOFF, 
eds, Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten 1918/19, 2 vols (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1969). 
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Invited to the session of 10 December 1918 were Baake, Schiffer, 
Simons, Count Bernstorff (wartime ambassador to the United States), 
Jackh, Ebert and Solf. 32 The last two had to decline. The discussion 
focused on the proposed constitution. Simons, Holtzendorff noted, was 
currently drafting an outline. The round-table participants generally thought 
that the constitution had to be organized federally and that the unitary 
strivings "which had much support in the country" should not be imple-
mented. Agreement existed that Prussia should not remain in its present 
form. One proposal included division into four large provinces. This pro-
posal "was rejected skillfully" by Schiffer, who pointed out that if Prussia 
were divided, the eastern provinces would be "damned to poverty". Then 
Holtzendorff reported: 
I took the opportunity of speaking alone with Schiffer about the financial 
agreements of the armistice terms, in accordance with the letter which Cuno 
had recently sent me [regarding tax impositions on property]. Schiffer ... did 
not believe that the Entente would enter into such detailed considerations. Yet, 
[he thought] our viewpoint very worthy and at his wish I have put Cuno's 
ideas on paper. Schiffer will immediately put it into the departmental mill and 
come back to it. · 
After a few minor matters, the discussion turned to the convening of the 
National Assembly: "All shared the opinion, that it was necessary to set 
the date as early as possible. Undersecretary Baake, so he told me, im-
mediately passed the proposal to [secretary of the interior] Preuss and 
Ebert." Holtzendorff also discovered that the Centre Party wanted to have 
the old Reichstag recalled merely to sanction the legality of the existing 
government. Though Holtzendorff thought the idea worthwhile Baake 
insisted this path could not be travelled. Holtzendorff closed with some 
minor business information, remarking that he would report separately on 
the meeting with the Foreign Office that morning. 
Before reporting on the Herrenabend of 4 January 1919, Holtzen-
dorff outlined the situation of four Hapag ships in Danzig. 33 He had con-
tacted the responsible officials in the Admiralty and in the Marine Office. 
They had been convinced to approve the ships' transport to German ports. 
In addition, the banker Max Warburg and industrialist Walther Rathenau 
had informed Holtzendorff of their conversations with the secret American 
delegation which had been in Berlin about peace negotiations. On the 
Herrenabend he listed the participants: Gwinner from the Deutsche 
Bank, Solf, Deutelmoser from the government information office, Jackh, 
Rauscher, Oertzen, Regendanz from the Warburg Bank, Langwerth from 
the Foreign Office, the Kaiser's former adjutant Admiral von Muller and 
Rathenau. Owing to pressing cabinet matter, Ebert, Baake and Rantzau 
had to decline. The discussion considered the political situation. "It ap-
pears as though the new member of the government, Noske, will now 
seriously start to reorganize the army. That is naturally a pre-condition if, 
32 The following information and citation are from Holtzendorff I and -n, Holtzendorff 
report to Hapag directory, II December 1918. 
JJ The following resume is based on Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Hapag 
directory, 5 January 1919. 
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as is presently intended, the fight with the Spartacists is to be energetically 
taken up." Rauscher informed Holtzendorff that Philipp Scheidemann and 
Ebert had sought a showdown with the marines during the Christmas 
fighting but found they were without sufficient means. Holtzendorff noted 
a similar situation existed for Noske with regard to Poland. Noske intend-
ed to create volunteer units, a reliable troop of eight to ten thousand men. 
Noske was prepared to take old officers, but they would have to serve at 
present under the conditions imposed by the soldiers' councils ; later the 
old system could be slowly restored. During this discussion Rathenau 
proposed two possible ways of creating a military: either through small 
local units recruited like a fire crew from reliable personnel, or by allowing 
officers to recruit men they knew. Noske's plan, the round-table members 
thought, was easier to realize, especially since Rathenau's second sugges-
tion would seem to be counter-revolutionary and could hardly be kept 
secret. With Rathenau, Holtzendorff also discussed air transport. New 
difficulties had surfaced in government circles. For the time being, the 
responsible officials wanted complete state control. Since the Hapag was 
intensively interested in this new method of transport, Holtzendorff ended: 
"I will have an opportunity in the presence of Cuno, when he is in Berlin, 
to visit the responsible government offices." 
Holtzendorff collected primarily two types of information through 
his Herrenabende as these sample reports illustrate. He tried to ferret out 
the political intentions of government leaders and, if possible, to affect 
policies. Second, he attempted to gain access to financial-economic 
information early, especially if it could affect his firm. Undoubtedly the 
Hapag wanted a head start on competitors. Holtzendorffs success as a 
lobbyist must be measured by two criteria: first, his influence on policies 
which might affect his firm or the social-political concepts of his class; 
second, knowledge gained about the intentions of those creating state 
policies. On the latter his success can be readily measured if the reports 
cited above are compared to other sources, especially the cabinet minutes, 
from the same period. 34 The information on the constitutional draft, the 
attempt to recall the Reichstag, or Ebert's and Scheidemann's preparedness 
for a forceful show-down with the marines indicate how well informed 
he kept the Hapag. The degree of success on the former is the story of 
the Herrenabend itself. 
Though the round-table discussions ranged all over the political and 
social landscape, Holtzendorff frequently steered them back to the 
shippers' interests. The casual mixing of business and politics reflected the 
34 A few examples might be selected. On the background to the putsch of6 December 
1918 and the role of the Foreign Office compare MILLER and PoTTHOFF, Regierung der 
Volksbeauftragten, I: 285ff., especially p. 292. On the drafting of a preliminary constitution 
see ibid., I: 251-52; on the possibility of calling the Reichstag, ibid., I : 381-92. On Ebert's 
hopes to gain approval for early elections at the council congress, a highly placed govern-
ment official confided the same view to his diary on 12 December 1918 (Trautmann Nachlass 
in private possession of Trautmann family, Berlin). On Ebert's and Scheidemann's inten-
tions during the December 1918 fighting compare MILLER and PoTTHOFF, Regierung der 
Volksbeauftragten, II: 73ff., where this fundamental question went unanswered. 
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salon's air of co-operation prevalent among leading Social Democrats, 
top-echelon administrators and representatives of the liberally inclined 
business-financial world. Given the revolutionary situation in Germany, 
and particularly in Berlin, these sessions seem an anomaly. But perhaps 
the easy entree by a lobbyist for a shipping firm to the very tip of the 
governmental pyramid provides insight into the social and political relation-
ships of Germany's elites. Since only Social Democrats and none of their 
coalition partners from the Independent Socialists participated, it appears 
that the Social Democratic leaders were already, early in December 1918, 
making a common front with the bourgeoisie without the Independents' 
knowledge. 35 Indeed, the information exchanged and the tenor of the 
discussions suggest that the leading Social Democrats found their "natural" 
discussion partners more among the upper bureaucracy and representatives 
from commerce and light industry than among the other political parties 
representing labour or socialists. The Herrenabend reports underscore 
that decisive individuals, for example Ebert, never sought to displace big 
business but rather sought to co-operate with it, just as the trade unions 
had through their pact of 15 November 1918 with the employer organiza-
tions. 36 Historians may have grasped the question by the wrong handle 
when they argue that the "revolutionary" leaders of 1918 should have 
exploited differences within the ranks of big business to create a new social 
structure. 37 Not changing, but maintaining and restoring, held top priority 
35 In analysing the "anti-revolutionary" endeavours of the SPD leadership, focus 
has been almost exclusively upon the co-operation with the military, in particular the 
Ebert-Groener "pact", on which U. KLUGE, Soldatenriite und Revolution (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), pp. 260fT., reviews the problem and the literature most 
thoroughly . The simultaneous co-operation with sectors of industry and the old bureaucracy 
has not been systematically investigated, though W. ELBEN, Das Problem der Kontinuitiit 
in der deutschen Revolution (DUsseldorf: Droste, 1965) provides an overview. In examining 
the relations of industry to labour, the latter has constantly been equated with the trade 
unions, without considering that, as the Holtzendorff documents illustrate, the Social 
Democrats worked primarily with representatives of light industry, while the trade unions 
worked primarily with heavy industry . Such distinctions are not even considered in what is 
probably the best analysis of the problem: G. D. FELDMAN, "The Social and Economic 
Policies of German Big Business, 1918-1929", American History Review, LXXV (1969): 
47-55. On the relations of the SPD to the Independent Socialists and the SPD to the bour-
geoisie (including bureaucracy), the authors of studies on the Independent Socialists sub-
scribe almost to a conspiracy theory (SPD against USPD) without providing substance for 
their assertions. See H. KRAUSE, USPD (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1975), pp. 
ll5ff., or Robert WHEELER, USPD und Internationale (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1975), pp. 45fT. 
36 A similar interpretation with substantial new evidence is in HAUPTS, Deutsche 
Friedenspolitik, pp. 212fT. 
37 The "revolutionary" leaders from the SPD were against any revolutionary action 
and this is missed by many authors, including E. KoLB, Arbeiterriite in der deutschen 
Innenpolitik /9/8-/9/9 (DUsseldorf: Droste, 1962). Kolb suggests that the authors (especially 
East German ones) who find the "opportunistic-reformist" SPD leaders "betrayed" the 
workers in voting war credits during August 1914 are illogical since the "opportunists" 
were merely being consistent. The same could be noted about Kolb who finds the SPD 
leaders were weak-minded and unclear about their goals during the World War, but excepts 
a decisive revolutionary leadership from the same people. If, as Kolb argues, pp. 24fT. and 
40ff., the democratization and transformation of Germany stood on the political agenda, 
then the removal of the SPD "opportunists" and anti-revolutionary leaders should have 
headed any "revolutionary" agenda. 
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for the decision-making element of the "revolutionary" leadership. Ebert 
had stated to the first Herrenabend he attended on 30 October 1918 that 
"the firm [Imperial Germany] can and must be upheld." 38 At issue for the 
men frequenting the Herrenabende was thus not the transformation of 
German society, but rather assuring co-operation among existing institu-
tions. Information not arising out of the Herrenabende but also conveyed 
by Holtzendorff to the Hapag substantiates the view that the form of co-
operation between the new government and the business community was 
at issue, not the displacement or breakup of concentrated economic power. 
Holtzendorff's round table should be seen in the context of the situation of 
the Hapag at war's end and of the relations between the shipping industry 
and the national government. 
The World War wreaked havoc with German shippers' business. 
By 1917 they had lost more than two million BRT of their 5.5 million 
total in 1914. Another million were stuck in allied or neutral ports. Trans-
oceanic shipping came to a complete stop, primarily owing to the British 
blockade. 39 The German shippers, especially the two largest firms, the 
Hapag and the Norddeutsche Lloyd, responded by trying to utilize their 
organizations in new ways as well as banding together, for instance in a 
common tourist operation. However, they recognized that they could not 
overcome the effects of the war on their own and soon turned to govern-
ment aid, especially since it became evident by 1917 that the Entente 
merchant fleets were rapidly expanding so that German shippers would 
face heightened and improved competition after the war. Through the 
Reichsausschuss der deutschen Reederei (War Committee of German 
shippers) a formal lobby was organized. They achieved a legislative suc-
cess, the Law for the Re-establishment of the German Trading Fleet in 
November 1917. 40 The shippers did not receive the full compensation 
for losses that they sought but they did · receive non-repayable loans which 
would begin immediately for the construction or gaining of merchant 
ships. In this business sector the leading firm was undoubtedly Albert 
Ballin's Hapag. Ballin had anticipated the post-war building boom and in 
1916 already fostered the building of a new wharf, adding another during 
1918. Ballin undertook these projects in conjunction with Ruhr coal-mining 
and smelting firms so as to tie their interests and resources to Hamburg's 
future shipping role. 41 When the war ended in German defeat and revolu-
tion the shipping firms found themselves in a difficult position for they 
feared that the Entente might place restrictions upon trade and that the 
demobilization might be coupled with government controls by the new 
"leftist" coalition of socialist parties ruling in Berlin. However, the 
shippers knew that the government needed employment and also aid in 
38 JA:cKH, Goldene Pflug, p. 449, citing a Herrenabend discussion ; confirmed by 
BA, R I/16, Holtzendorff report of 31 October 1918. 
39 This section is based primarily upon P. WULF, "Schwerindustrie und Seeschif-
fahrt nach dem l. Weltkrieg: Hugo Stinnes und die Hapag", Vierte/jahrschrift fiir Sozial-
und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 67 (1980): Iff. 
40 See CECIL, Albert Ballin , pp. 230ff., and BA, 1/13-6, Holtzendorff reports. 
41 See WuLF, "Schwerindustrie und Seeschiffahrt", pp. 5-6. 
468 HISTOIRE SOCIALE- SOCIAL HISTORY 
transporting foodstuffs. In this context Holtzendorff's reports on his lob-
bying become especially revealing. 
On 11 November 1918 Holtzendorff offered the Hapag's services to 
the head of the provisional government Reich Chancellor Ebert. 42 Out 
of that offer a meeting occurred on 15 November 1918. Ebert, August 
Muller for the economics ministry, Seelinger for the foreign office and 
Wilhelm Dittmann, who was responsible for transportation in the pro-
visional government, represented the government. Stapelfeldt of the 
Bremen N orddeutsche Lloyd and Holtzendorff and Cuno of the Hapag 
attended on behalf of the war committee, or cartel, of German shippers. 
Cuno stated without opposition from the government representatives: 
The only fact which the war has left behind in the economic field is the pos-
sibility of reviving the free economy. It must be taken up without delay be-
cause it is already needed during the demobilization. It dare not halt at the 
borders of the Reich, but must, as before the war, extend to oversea areas 
if the Reich and Yolk are to survive. 43 
Cuno offered the co-operation of the German shipping industry in 
rebuilding the economy through a deal . If the shippers made transport 
means available, continued building ships already under construction, and 
offered advisers for the armistice negotiations, then in return they asked 
the government for authorization to prepare mothballed ships, for the 
demobilization officials' assurance that the wharfs had supplies, and for 
the shipping experts' participation in the armistice negotiations. Ebert 
thanked the shippers and emphasized the significance of this sector for the 
future of the Reich and assured he would do all in his power to have the 
sea-faring vessels moving again. In particular, Ebert was prepared to allow 
representatives of the shippers to participate in the peace negotiations and 
asked that they contact Erzberger immediately since the latter was busy 
with the peace preparations. 
The other government officials indicated that they basically agreed 
with the shippers' proposals, including keeping all vessels under the 
German flag. Muller offered to sign the necessary authorizations. In a 
separate letter Holtzendorff reported that Erzberger had been sympathetic 
- the shippers would be heard in any case. The shipping firms could 
participate but Erzberger cautioned that the Entente wanted only a small 
number at the negotiations. Erzberger showed no reservations about de-
tailing past armistice negotiations. He provided the Hapag with the official 
texts though they were to be kept secret. Erzberger delineated his plans 
for the peace negotiations. He also suggested how Germany might pay 
its debts by selling Alsace-Lorraine potash supplies to the Americans. 
Indeed, the idea of "shifting German debts onto American shoulders" 
found frequent mention. 44 
42 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Ebert , 11 November 1918. 
43 The quotations and information in the following are based on Cuno's notes from 15 
November 1918 in Holtzendorff XVIII. 
44 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Hapag directory, 16 November 1918. 
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The manner in which Ebert and Erzberger took up the shippers' 
requests indicates that all these groups - shipping industry, bureaucratic 
elite, Social Democratic and Centre Party leaders - saw their situation 
as a shared difficulty. The viewpoint of many historians that these groups 
stood diametrically or partially opposed to each other, finds little basis 
in these reports. 45 Indeed, when Cuno reported back to the Hamburg 
shippers the day after his meeting with Ebert, he stated:· "Among the 
members of the national government . . . [I] ... found full understanding for 
the situation of the shippers and complete preparedness to recognize, if 
at all possible, the interests of German sea faring." 46 If it is time to seek 
why and how the winners emerged during the German Revolution of 1918, 
as a leading historian recently argued, then these documents imply a 
significant aspect of the answer: the industrialists were hardly threatened. 47 
The "external threat" to the nation-state, with which all the significant 
groups in Germany from unions and Social Democracy to military and 
industry identified, united them to face a common "enemy", the Entente, 
whose threatening existence the armistice terms had reinforced. 
The co-operation sought by the shippers and the government did 
not mean perfect harmony reigned. In particular the signing of the armistice 
renewal during January 1919 brought a sharp clash. Under pressure from 
the Entente, Erzberger signed a renewal on 16 January before the shippers' 
experts could be consulted. The terms, in effect, transferred control over 
the German merchant fleet to the Entente. Naturally the shippers protest-
ed, first asking the government not to ratify the agreement. When that 
proved impossible, they asserted that under such conditions they could 
not help to rebuild the economy, that unemployment and the destruction 
of German shipping would result. Once they recognized that the govern-
ment had had no choice but to sign, the shippers appealed for attempts 
to gain a modification. That had been possible with the December armistice 
on farm machinery. 48 When attempts at modification failed, the shippers 
made the best of a bad situation by organizing a campaign to gain full 
45 For example, E. EYCK, A History of the Weimar Republic, 2 vols (Cambridge, 
Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1961), 1: 76ff., and R.N. HuNT, German Social Demo-
cracy 1918-/933 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), p. 32, though most authors assume this 
opposition without exploring the question or differentiating between the actions and assump-
tions of the leadership and the members of the socialist movement. This gap between a 
leadership which placed priority upon maintaining society and state and a membership which 
expected a transformation of both is touched upon by S. MILLER, "Die Sozialdemokratie 
in der Spannung zwischen Oppositionstradition und Regierungsverantwortung in den Anfangen 
der Weimarer Republik", in Sozialdemokratie zwischen Klassenbewegung und Volkspartei, 
ed.: H. MOMMSEN (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1974), pp. 95-97. 
46 Cuno Lebensmittelversorgung, Cuno report to Hapag and Hamburg shippers, 15 
November 1918. 
47 G. D. FELDMAN, "Wirtschafts-und sozialpolitische Probleme der deutschen 
Demobilmachung 1918/19", in lndustriel/es System, eds : MOMMSEN, PETZINA, WEISBROD, 
p. 618. A similar perspective was previously presented by D. K. BusE, "Friedrich Ebert 
and German Socialism, 1871-1919" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1972), pp. 3-5. 
48 Cuno Friedensverhandlungen, exchange of telegrams between Hamburg shippers 
and Ebert, 19 January, 1919. See also E. MARHEFKA, ed., Der Waffensti/lstand 1918-1919, 
3 vols (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1928), II: 28ff; and telegram from war committee of 
German shippers to Ebert, 20 January 1919, in Cuno collection. 
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compensation for their losses. On 30 January Holtzendorff noted that the 
Hamburg and Bremen shippers had again been in Berlin to negotiate with 
the government. But first they had conferred among themselves. The ship-
pers agreed that in estimating losses, present market value of the ships, 
not the value at the time of loss, had to be the basis for negotiations. If 
the government did not want to accept ''three times peacetime value plus 
twenty percent" then evaluations by experts would be demanded. 49 They 
discussed which officials and government leaders were most amenable and 
which were most opposed to the shippers' position. Jonquieres from the 
economics ministry was thought to be the most favourable, whereas Noske 
had "in this instance again thrown his old socialization ideas into the 
debate". Holtzendorff had been instructed to inform Jonquieres of the 
shippers' position. 
On one issue full agreement existed between the government and the 
shippers: private property had to be protected. Holtzendorff's report of 
30 January mentioned the attempt to obtain military protection for the 
shippers' property. During a meeting with the minister of defence, Cuno 
informed Noske that negotiations had begun between the central organiza-
tion of German shippers and the seamen's union in Hamburg. But the 
international seamen's union, according to Cuno "an institution of the 
far Left-radical seamen with strong Spartacist tendencies", demanded 
to participate. Though Cuno misestimated this union's political affiliation 
and ascribed frustration at internal union differences to Bolshevism, the 
harbour workers and seamen were primarily radicalized by Hamburg's 
unemployment, limited food supplies and inflation. 50 When the shippers 
refused to negotiate, the union threatened to use force not only against 
the property of the shippers but the shippers themselves. Therefore strong 
military protection had to arrive quickly. Holtzendorff added that Noske 
had confidentially informed them that a heavily armed, four-thousand man 
troop was marching on Bremen. Since he did not have enough troops to 
undertake the same action against Hamburg, Noske hoped the "energetic 
measures in Bremen would have a favourable influence on Hamburg". 51 
Later, Noske's adjutant Gilsa telephoned Holtzendorff and assured him 
that the workers' and soldiers' councils would protect the shippers' 
property. 
Most of Holtzendorff's report of 30 January 1919 concerned the 
efforts to gain a lucrative compensation agreement. At a three-and-one-
quarter hour meeting between the representatives of the shippers and the 
representatives of the economic, finance and marine ministries, Jonquieres 
reviewed an earlier meeting with the provisional government on 27 January: 
"The atmosphere had not been friendly toward the shippers: the pro-
visional government seemed to be under the impression that the shippers 
49 The following, including citations, is based on Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzen-
dorff notes of 30 January 1919. 
50 See R. A. CoMFORT, Revolutionary Hamburg : Labor Politics in the Early 
Weimar Republic (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 68, 91ff., 106. 
51 This citation and following information based on Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzen-
dorff report to Hapag, 30 January 1919; the cabinet minutes for this period provide no further 
information on Noske's activities. 
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wanted to achieve special, private advantages." The provisional govern-
ment could only be persuaded that if the shippers incurred losses, they 
were to be compensated. The government had refused any contract or 
formula on evaluation. But Holtzendorff had privately been assured by 
Jonquieres that the shippers' demands had not been totally rejected; they 
were not discussable at present. A member of the bureaucracy here acted 
in favour of the shippers with whom he was to work out the details of 
·principles set down by the government. To the ministry officials the 
shippers re-emphasized the conditions which they wanted. Jonquieres tried 
to moderate their demands by stating that "it was not possible to obtain 
more from the government.'' Another official supported him: ''From 
among the cabinet members Ebert had expressly announced that in the 
case of losses the shippers had to be compensated. But any further guaran-
tees ... were sharply rejected." Another official stated further demands 
might be the first step toward state take-over. Cuno immediately counter-
ed that then the shippers would rethink their own programme of ship build-
ing which could mean much unemployment. In the end the matter was left 
at the exchange of telegrams in which compensation had been requested 
by the shippers and a general guarantee provided by the government. The 
shippers could not gain their specific terms. Noteworthy is that state 
intervention only arose as a possibility after the shippers insisted on 
extensive gains. 
In concluding this report Holtzendorff mentioned that an official from 
the marine ministry had warned about difficulties because the shippers had 
obtained monies for repairs but none had been undertaken. The official had 
suggested making a few repairs to undermine those wishing to utilize this 
information against the shippers. Further he suggested the threat of social-
ization should not be underestimated. Noske and other important indi-
viduals, the official confidentially informed Holtzendorff, were playing with 
the idea of a state take-over of shipping. Nothing came of such ideas -
if they were serious is doubtful - and, as later reports reveal, Noske 
became a frequent and cherished guest at the round table. The government 
and the shippers continued to co-operate though they occasionally dis-
agreed on how the shippers' interests were to be handled. Meanwhile 
these lobbying activities by Holtzendorff complemented his use of the 
political salon. 
The Herrenabend reports and the other information submitted by 
Holtzendorff reflect one striking element: the number of individuals in 
the highest echelons to which he had frequent access and the extent to 
which they shared information with him. For example, members of the 
general staff informed him of the secret conversations between the Ameri-
can and German governments preliminary to the armistice and peace 
negotiations. He even obtained an official report from 12 February 1919 
in which an American officer presented views on France's current attitude 
toward Germany, the route of returning American soldiers and the delay 
in food supply shipments. 52 Through his contacts and his information 
s2 Cuno Lebensmittelversorgung, Holtzendorff report; similar information in Holt-
zendorff I and II, Holtzendorff report to Cuno, 28 February 1919. On these conversations, 
472 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
Holtzendorff not only provided himself with a basis for representing the 
Hapag's interests. He gained enough insight into the decisive government 
institutions and the leading politicians' intentions for his Herrenabende 
to become a meeting-place between equals. 
Holtzendorff early attained a position near the heart of the Weimar 
political world. He appeared not as a pleading outsider, but as a confident 
insider. Typical was a Herrenabend on 26 February 1919 attended by 
Schiffer, Dernburg, Petersen, Siidekum, Naumann, Gilsa and Albert. 53 
After obtaining a promise that Erzberger' s secret memorandum on the 
armistice negociations would be supplied to the Hapag, Holtzendorff led 
the discussion to the armistice terms of January. He argued that under 
the pretence of foodstuff transport the Entente had achieved control over 
German shipping, against which the government representative Erzberger 
had done nothing. Only Petersen took exception to this interpretation and 
attack on the government. In an aside intended for the reader of the report, 
namely Cuno, Holtzendorff mentioned that an article in the Berliner Tage-
blatt by Dombrowski stated the issue "correctly" and was undoubtedly 
based on information Holtzendorff had supplied to Theodor Wolff, the 
editor. Most of the round-table session focused on taxation, especially 
property taxes. To Holtzendorff, Dernburg expressed "his worries about 
how a property tax would affect industry ... But that will not change the 
fact that we must expect an enormous property tax." With Gilsa Holtzen-
dorff discussed the internal situation and learned that Noske's adjutant 
thought the latest Spartacist unrest could be readily controlled. When 
Holtzendorff informed Siidekum that he had heard critical remarks about 
Siidekum's speech on Germany's financial situation, Siidekum agreed to 
correct the impression. On the Austrian anschluss question Holtzendorff 
learned that many German politicians' reservations stemmed from Austria's 
financial difficulties. Siidekum also proposed, and the round table con-
sidered, the creation of a small press council in major German cities to 
influence the press. Holtzendorff concluded: "The gentlemen remained 
here last night until twelve o'clock and were particularly grateful for the 
opportunity to express themselves in a small confidential group." 
By the end of February 1919 Holtzendorff had become a respected 
social co-ordinator within the new German state. Ebert invited him to 
join the newly-established bureau of the Reich President. But the Hapag, 
especially Cuno, wanted Holtzendorff to remain in its service. Holtzen-
dorff promised Ebert private aid instead. 54 Why Ebert offered Holtzen-
dorff the post becomes evident from Holtzendorff's remark about others 
whom Ebert selected for his staff: "All these individuals lack contacts 
in the economic field so Ebert was especially grateful that I was prepared 
known as the Conger-Loeb discussions, consult F. EPSTEIN, "Zwischen Compiegne und 
VersaiUes", Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, III (1955): 412ff.; H. ScHULZE, ed., Das 
Kabinett Scheidemann (Boppard: Boldt, 1971), p. 28. 
53 Citations and information from Holtzendorff I and II , Holtzendorff to Cuno, 27 
February 1919. 
54 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 28 February 1919. 
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to help him." 55 Holtzendorff included an evaluation of his own en-
deavours: "Obviously I will do all I can here [in Weimar] to influence 
again the mood of the parties in the National Assembly to favour our 
interests." 56 Knowing top government officials and party leaders very well 
and having become an adviser to the Reich President, Holtzendorff had 
established the pre-conditions for successful lobbying through his poli-
tical salon. 
The round table of 18 March 1919 illustrates well the int~rweaving 
of Holtzendorff's negotiations and contacts with the government with the 
political policy discussions at the H errenabende. 57 Early in the day Cuno 
and Holtzendorff had discussed crews for ships transporting food with 
government officials. Unfortunately, Holtzendorff noted, the economics 
ministry had negotiated with the seamen's union and thereby recognized 
them as partners. In his telegraph to Hamburg Holtzendorff outlined Jon-
quieres' thinking: the economics ministry should temporarily arbitrate 
between the shippers and the union ; a quick agreement had to be reached 
because of the ships' impending departure; and, the union's power was so 
great nothing could be done without their co-operation. Jonquieres, whose 
ministry was to act as a "neutral" arbiter, suggested the negotiations 
could begin in Hamburg, and if unity were not achieved his ministry in 
Berlin could act as a last resort for the shippers. However, Jonquieres 
refused to accept the shippers' immediate demands until he had heard from 
the union "despite all sharp counter-proposals from Cuno and Holtzen-
dorff''. Jonquieres had the support of his ministerial colleagues; "all three 
based their views on the power at the union's disposal." With the issue 
unsettled, Cuno and Holtzendorff invited Ebert, his secretary Baake, 
Erzberger, Bernstorff and Simons to dine with them. The banker Warburg 
joined them. Holtzendorff recorded that: 
I immediately brought the discussion to the meeting with Jonquieres, and I as 
well as Cuno indicated ... to these gentlemen what difficult and problematic 
consequences the stance of the economics ministry could have. Happily, the 
Reich President and Erzberger were fully of our opinion that one could not 
give in to the seamen's union. Finally it was resolved to await the results of 
the negotiations and eventually to contact the Reichswehr minister regarding 
military intervention as well as making the necessary noises in the press to 
make the whole world see that through the unpleasant actions of the seamen's 
union food supplies were again endangered since these radical elements once 
more hindered and made difficult the task of getting the ships underway. ss 
The degree of agreement on such ideological issues is as noteworthy as 
the openness with which business and political questions were mixed. 
ss Ibid.; Holtzendorff had also suggested that Cuno write Ebert a personal letter of 
thanks; on 1 March 1919 Holtzendorff thanked Cuno for sending a letter of explanation to 
Ebert. 
s6 Ibid. ; compare CECIL, Albert Ballin, pp. 250, 252. 
S1 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff notes, 18 March 1919; on 14 March the Ger-
man government had signed an agreement for the utilization of German ships to haul Entente 
foodstuffs to Germany. Compare ScHULZE, Kabinett Scheidemann, pp. 45ff. 
ss Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff notes, 18 March 1919. 
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Holtzendorff's lobbying success depended on cultivating contacts and 
gaining confidence. He consciously pursued these aims. For example, on 
2 April 1919, "Cuno and I talked about the necessity of gaining contact 
with the chief of the admiralty, Vizeadmiral Trotha." 59 On 17 July 1919: 
"I organized last night's Herrenabend in order to gain access to the new 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miiller." 60 Holtzendorff's systematic pursual 
of the leading persons, especially cabinet ministers, appears in a notation 
after the new cabinet had been formed in June 1919: "I hope to see [Chan-
cellor] Bauer ... and the present Minister of Economics Schmidt here yet 
this week. Then I will again have the necessary contact with all decisive 
offices which are of interest to us." 61 
If a lobbyist's effectiveness depends upon obtaining the confidence 
of those to be influenced then a prime example is Holtzendorff's relation-
ship with Joseph Koeth, the demobilization commissioner. During March 
and April 1919 Koeth negotiated with the shippers on a programme to 
construct freighters. On 5 April Holtzendorff wrote that he was reporting 
his most recent negotiations with Koeth by letter because the contents 
"were not of the sort to be given by telephone". 62 Koeth had set a dead-
line of 6 April and stated his reasons for placing the shippers under pres-
sure. These reasons he did not want known publicly. 
Koeth was personally extraordinarily kind and informed me very confidentially 
that he intentionally placed great pressure upon the shippers, which was in their 
own interest. He had been secretly informed - and he asked that this be con-
sidered exceptionally confidential [underlined in original] - it was intended to 
ask in the National Assembly about the delay ... It would be said that neither 
the demobilization office nor the shippers had attacked the problem with suf-
ficient energy and the state had to intervene. That would naturally be the first 
step towards socializing the shipping industry. In order to prevent that and 
only for that reason, did he pressure so dictatorially ... because only then 
could he emphasize in response to the National Assembly that everything 
possible was happening to attain a contract. 
Koeth was particularly worried about socialization: "He is a great enemy 
of these ideas and therefore wants to play a preventive role." 
Being aware of the tactics employed by those whose confidence he 
gained, Holtzendorff knew he had to be cautious with certain politicians. 
For instance, on the evening of 2 April 1919 Holtzendorff dined publicly 
with the Finance Minister and Jackh. The aged liberal Eugen Payer appear-
ed and "it was therefore not possible in an unobtrusive way to bring the 
conversation with Schiffer to our steamer Furst Bismarck." 63 The 
Bismarck had been sold by the Hapag but the Entente refused to acknowl-
edge the sale. Holtzendorff concluded: "I shall visit Schiffer about it." 
The purpose behind the intensive cultivation of contacts and trust 
clearly related to the Hapag's many interests. Between 1918 and 1920, on 
s9 Ibid., Holtzendorff notes, 3 April 1919. 
60 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 17 July 1919. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Citations and information based on Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 
5 April 1919. 
63 Ibid., Holtzendorff notes of 3 April 1919. 
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such questions as compensation for loss of ships, taxation regulations, 
air transport subventions or special terms for the shipping industry under 
the reparations agreements, Holtzendorff worked intensively to influence 
the cabinet. On 11 July 1919, not long after the Versailles Treaty placed 
the German shippers in the difficult situation of having to hand over the 
remainder of their merchant fleet as reparations, the Hapag directors 
invited Erzberger to dinner. "The discussion went very satisfactorily. 
After the very general political talk ... we came to our matter. The quint-
essence was that very quickly a list of the value of German ships which 
have been handed over or are in neutral ports or being built, must be given 
to Erzberger." 64 Cuno promised to have a list ready in eight days and 
then Erzberger would arrange for payment. Erzberger 
feared that if it did not transpire quickly, the reparations commission might 
intervene under the pretext that the sums which the Reich owed us had to be 
set back in favour of the sums owed to our enemies. We are to estimate the 
ships' value ourselves and later they could be evaluated again by third-party 
experts. To this purpose we will already contact the third party surreptitiously 
so no great differences appear in the two evaluations. 
In addition to this manreuvre Cuno argued that the shippers needed to 
get back into business and for that transport means were necessary which, 
since the Entente was taking away newly-produced ships, could only be 
bought. Therefore, payment for the ships had to be advanced quickly and 
Erzberger agreed in principle to an advance payment when the list was 
prepared. 
The shippers encountered the same co-operation when they visited 
Erzberger about Reichsnotopfer (special taxation). Erzberger refused any 
delay of the taxation but agreed to hear the shippers on details. He assured 
them that the valuations would be made so that "no economic unit as such 
would be endangered". 65 Here the shippers wanted a low evaluation on 
the same ships they had previously wanted evaluated at high rates for 
compensation purposes. Erzberger guaranteed this and Holtzendorff fit-
tingly commented that "the results of the discussion were in my opinion 
very positive for us." 
The ability to manipulate between policies and persons is further 
illustrated in Holtzendortrs relationship to Undersecretary Albert of the 
Reich Chancellery. Albert took a particularly friendly attitude towards the 
shipping industry. When the ship evaluation did not go exactly as plan-
ned, Holtzendorff wrote on 6 November 1919 that 
I took the opportunity at my Herrenabend yesterday to complain energetically 
about the miserable treatm~nt which the shippers received in the marine 
evaluations · to the Reich President, Undersecretary Albert and Vice-Admiral 
Trotha. The chief of the admiralty .. . fully agreed with me and Albert promised 
that he would still speak with the Chancellor today about the matter and attain 
64 Holtzendorff III and IV, Citations from Holtzendorff notes, 12 July 1919. 
Compare P. WuLF, ed., Das Kabinett Fehrenbach (Boppard : Boldt, 1972), pp. 480,499. 
65 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 7 October 1919 ; on the taxation 
question see K. EPSTEIN, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 338ff. 
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improvements. Further I spoke with Foreign Minister MiiUer and Albert in 
depth on the consequences which the new Entente note [regarding the hand-
ing over of cranes and dock supplies as reparations] would have on German 
sea faring and trade. Naturally I painted in the darkest colours. 66 
Albert again assured him that the Chancellor would agree fully with the 
shippers' position. Later in the month Albert aided Holtzendorff once 
more: 
As we agreed in our conversation yesterday I went to Albert today and inform-
ed him of the situation. He counselled the following path : he would speak with 
the Chancellor and ask him to permit an audience . . . Albert thought it right 
and clever to invite Jonquieres to this audience and for him to suggest a 
Che.fkonferenz (internal cabinet) to present our viewpoint. Albert thought it 
unwise to have representatives of the shippers at the internal session because 
Erzberger would become distrustful . . . that we were achieving something in 
a round about way and wanted to place pressure on him ... Albert and I agreed 
on using Jonquieres because the latter undoubtedly has a heart for the shippers 
and is as objective as it is possible for an administrator to be. 67 
With the compensation rate for lost ships again at stake, Holtzendorff's 
confidential relationship to the bureaucracy undoubtedly aided the Hapag. 68 
The cabinet minutes of the period November-December 1919 confirm that 
the admiralty, the state officials as well as the politicians Holtzendorff 
identified did support the position outlined at the Holtzendorff discussions. 69 
A high degree of ideological unity developed among Holtzendorff's 
main guests. At a round table during April 1919 Holtzendorff asked Noske 
"why he still tolerated the press of the Independent Socialists, especially 
Freiheit and Roter Galgen (Rote Fahne, the main Communist Party 
newspaper) in Berlin. Noske answered that he could not outlaw these 
papers just before the council congress since it would be seen as a provo-
cation. After the congress he would use the first opportunity to make these 
papers dead silent." 70 Similarly, the shippers found the bureaucracy inclin-
ed to share their disparaging views of the workers' and soldiers' councils. 
On 27 April 1919 Cuno and Holtzendorff saw Jonquieres about workers' 
councils on the food transport ships which Cuno announced were an 
impossibility. 
Jonquieres completely agreed. He too thought workers' councils on board an 
impossibility, but maintained that the shippers could not avoid employees' and 
workers' councils for the whole industry. In his opinion it would be impossible 
to make an exception for the shipping industry and he suggested placing em-
phasis upon constituting these councils, since they had to be erected, so that 
they covered the whole industry, not single ships, and therefore always met 
on land ." 71 
66 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 6 November 1919. 
67 Ibid., Holtzendorff to Cuno , 27 November 1919. Compare BA, R 43 1/2, 
" Chefbesprechung", 27 February 1920. 
68 ELBEN, Problem der Kontinuitiit, has left this second level of bureaucrats and 
their readiness to co-operate with industry unexamined . 
69 See especially the cabinet session of 9 December 1919 in M. VooT, ed., Das 
Kabinett Bauer (Boppard : Boldt, 1978), pp. 461-63, 466-68, 498ff. 
70 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 7 April 1919. Later in the year 
Noske prohibited Freiheit without even consulting the cabinet (see minutes of the SPD 
caucus for 10 October 1919 at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam). 
71 Holtzendorff I and II, Holtzendorff notes of 27 April 1919. 
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The anti-Left attitude also surfaced in November 1919 when General 
Groener related to the round table a plan he had begun to develop with 
General Pershing early in the year to fight Bolshevism but which had 
been undermined by President Wilson. 72 Or, another instance from January 
1920: 
With a certain grim humour Noske described to me , naturally very confidentially, 
his discussions and instructions which he had given to Social Democratic 
journalists yesterday . He had ... declared that no matter which workers - be 
they railworkers or miners or postal or whoever - begin a strike, he would let 
the leaders be taken directly to Moabit [jail]. The journalists were to make 
clear to the people throughout the land that he was not fooling and the situa-
tion was so serious that only the worst and sharpest measures helped. 73 
Agreement existed not only concerning the Left. The Right in the 
form of the German Nationalists and parts of heavy industry were also 
criticized. The round table participants of 14 November 1919 shared the 
viewpoint that the Nationalists were misusing General Hindenburg's name. 
When Noske asserted that "the gentlemen from the Right had in the first 
period not been able to say enough kind and worthwhile things about me, 
but now attacked me and undermined my authority in the military", Holt-
zendorff added that "the German Nationalists remain, as most of my 
upper-class comrades in the conservative party, very short-sighted and 
have no political nose for that which is presently necessary". 74 The liberals 
attending Holtzendorff' s sessions naturally placed great hopes in the 
German Democratic Party. At a Herrenabend on 9 October 1919 Holt-
zendorff and Schiffer discussed why this party alone should be supported: 
Schiffer regretted extremely that industry provided so little financing for the 
Democratic Party , since the German People's Party was surely a hopeless 
matter, especially after Stresemann had officially committed himself to the 
monarchy ... A government of the Right, even including the bourgeois parties, 
would be an impossibility in Germany's present situation, for the consequences 
would be a series of strikes. The only party which in the future can work with 
the Social Democrats and the Centre is the Democratic Party and in that lies 
its great value, for the Democrats can keep the Social Democrats a bit under 
control and above all support the right-wing Social Democrats, who will 
certainly be weakened by the elections, against the left wing, especially the 
Independents and Communists. 75 
In late 1919 and early 1920 the Social Democratic leaders too favoured 
a middle-of-the-road coalition, without of course knowing the extent to 
which elements of light industry saw them primarily as objects of their 
power plays. 76 The support for a politics of the "middle" also appeared 
72 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 15 November 1919; compare 
ScHULZE, Kabinett Scheidemann , pp . 210ff. , especially p. 214. The question as to whether 
actual contacts had been taken up between the Entente and the German military for the 
purpose of fighting Bolshevism can thus be answered affirmatively. 
73 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 29 January 1920. 
74 Ibid., Holtzendorff to Cuno , 15 November 1919. 
75 Ibid., Holtzendorff to Cuno, 10 October 1919. 
76 For the SPD see especially the discussion between Bauer and Koch-Weser, 
November 1919 (BA, Koch-Weser Nachlass 16/303-305), partially cited in A. KASTNING, 
Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie zwischen Koalition und Opposition (Paderbom: Schoningh, 
1970), p. 39. For the liberals see L. ALBERTIN, Liberalismus und Demokratie am Anfang 
der Weimarer Republik (Dusseldorf : Droste, 1972), pp. 355ff. and R. OPITZ, Der deutsche 
Sozialliberalismus (Koln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1973). 
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in Holtzendorff's question to Simons, who had become manager for the 
largest employers' association after his career in the Reich administration, 
on how he combined his new position with his convictions. "Simons 
argued that he had made his acceptance conditional upon no politics a Ia 
heavy industry". 77 The German People's Party was also criticized in this 
circle for having circulated the retouched, scandalous picture of Noske and 
Ebert in swimming trunks. 78 The anti-Left and anti-Right attitudes pre-
valent in this political salon not only confirm old adages about birds of a 
feather flocking together, but that a community of men interested in the 
continuance of the Weimar system had coalesced. 
Two preliminary conclusions emerge from Holtzendorff's extensive 
contacts. First, the continuance of the Imperial bureaucracy into the new 
state gave the established power factors in the economic realm - industry 
in all forms - a huge jump over such newcomers as the unions. The 
differences within the unions and socialists, indeed, labour in general, were 
successfully exploited by the entrepreneurs and help explain their emergen-
ce unscathed from the revolution. 79 Second, emphasizing a cosy relation-
ship between elements of Social Democracy, the state bureaucracy, the 
shipping industry and the leaders of the German Democratic Party does 
not suggest that politically inclined persons should not participate in 
forums, discussions or exchanges of their choosing. The workings of the 
Weimar Republic, however, become more understandable when it is 
known that Noske and Mi.iller were more open with these discussion 
partners than with their own caucus which continually complained about 
a lack of information on the government's intentions. 80 These SoCial Dem-
ocrats may not have "betrayed" their cause or their following, but they 
played with cards from different decks on each occasion. The recently 
advanced perspective that Weimar Social Democracy had a dual character 
- one element, the social-liberal, hoping to improve capitalism for the 
workers' benefit and one element, the socialist-reformist, hoping to over-
come capitalism through parliament - is supported in that the leaders of 
the former element were making common cause here with the bourgeois 
liberals. 81 
In the Holtzendorff round-table sessions the major participants seem 
to have stepped out of the role one would have anticipated from their 
party-interest afffiiation. Given the participants' diverse origins, the sur-
prising element is the apparent agreement on the general purpose behind 
German politics. Without considering the dynamics of small groups, a 
hypothesis may be advanced. Just as the war had demonstrated that the 
77 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 10 October 1919. 
78 Ibid. The picture appeared in the Berliner lllustrierte, 21 August 1919, as Ebert 
signed the new constitution into force and he and Noske began official state visits to 
southern Germany. 
79 Compare FELDMAN, "The Social and Economic Policies", p. 48. 
8° For example, caucus minutes (see note 70) of 28 October 1919 and PARTEI-
VORSTAND, Protoko/1 der Sitzung des Parteiausschussess (Berlin: Verlag der Sozialdemo-
kratie, 1919), pp. 7, 36 (session of 13 December 1919). 
81 G. FtJLBERTH and J. HARRER, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie /890-/933 (Darm-
stadt: Luchterhand, 1974), pp. 18ff. 
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trade unions and Social Democracy were so integrated into the German 
political and social system that they were forced to try to make it function, 
indeed, they were the last to leave the sinking ship, now those elements 
of the bureaucracy, industry and military which had successfully defended 
themselves during the Revolution of 1918 were so intertwined with the new 
system that they were forced to try to make it function. Holtzendorff's 
political salon may have been, unintentionally, such a reflex action and, 
thereby, a stabilizing factor in the early Weimar Republic. 
Typical of this "negative integration" of some elements of big business 
is the consequence of Holtzendorffs' salon for the managing director of the 
Hapag, Cuno. He was kept in the eye of officials and cabinet members. 
Rathenau apparently stated about this elegant, suave future Chancellor: 
"That cigar too will have to be smoked." 82 These documents show how 
often matches were lit. Cuno met very frequently with cabinet members 
and reiterated his belief in a free-market economy. By early 1920 he had 
a high reputation as a financial expert. In March 1920 when a scandal 
forced Erzberger to resign as finance minister, Cuno was chosen as his 
successor. Warburg proposed a cabinet of non-party "experts": Cuno 
(finance), Schmidt (food supply), Wiedfeldt (economics), Rantzau (foreign 
affairs) . They would replace the party-affiliated ministers with Bauer re-
maining as Chancellor. 83 Well before Erzberger tendered his resignation, 
lists were being established of undersecretaries, the response of the 
People's Party checked and the Hapag directory requested to give Cuno 
leave. 84 Behind the scenes Holtzendorff handled arrangements with Ebert, 
Schiffer and Albert. After discussions with party leaders Holtzendorff 
thought a cabinet of experts improbable though Muller personally was 
prepared to relinquish foreign affairs. The Centre wanted Josef Wirth to 
obtain treasury if Cuno took finances. Cuno replied he still awaited, on 9 
March, a meeting of the Hapag directory and wanted three matters clarifi-
ed: who would follow the Social Democrat Hirsch as economics under-
secretary (Cuno insisted on his removal); what views did Wirth have, in 
case he obtained treasury; could the Foreign Office be persuaded to 
accept Cuno's economic policies. 85 Holtzendorff again spoke with Schiffer 
who suggested possible undersecretaries, assured that Wirth could easily 
be controlled and maintained that the Foreign Office "could be brought 
into the same current" since the decisive department head was amenable. 86 
Ironically, Holtzendorff negotiated with Schiffer, Albert and Trimbom of 
82 Cited in K.-H. HARBECK, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno (Boppard: Boldt, 1968), 
p . vii. 
83 Ho1tzendorff XXIII, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 8 March 1920; already on 1 March 
1920, Holtzendorff, Ebert, Bauer, Koch, Seeckt and Schiffer had agreed that Erzberger 
could not possibly remain in office. As ALBERTIN, Liberalismus und Demokratie, p. 360, 
notes, the liberals had taken over the terminology of the political Right regarding a cabinet 
of experts and the hope to "de-politicize the economic ministries". 
84 Ho1tzendorff XXIII, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 8 March 1920; the information in 
these documents corrects the view that Erzberger's removal did not alter the coalition 
cabinet's make-up as argued by R. MoRSEY, Die deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917-1933 (Dussel-
dorf: Droste, 1966), p. 300. 
85 Holtzendorff XXIII, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 9 March 1920. 
86 Ibid., Holtzendorff to Cuno, 11 March 1920. 
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the Centre about Cuno's terms just days before the Kapp Putsch on 13 
March 1920 sent the national government scurrying to Dresden and Stutt-
gart. Cuno had set down his views on reparations, socialization and under-
secretaries but the Hapag directory still delayed Cuno's leave. 
Schiffer asked me [Holtzendorff] to inform you [Cuno] that an individual from 
the Hapag . . . occupying the most important post in the ministry .. . would 
strengthen the Hapag's position against its competitors ... All asked me to 
re-emphasize to you and the directory how important your entry into the 
cabinet is right now. 8 7 
The Kapp Putsch interrupted these negotiations , but their existence 
reveals that one part of the industrial world had no inkling of the Kapp 
adventure. 88 These businessmen, having become an integral part of the 
system, recognized the need to make it function . Naturally they did not 
seek to follow the pattern of the factionalized parties ; the proposed cabinet 
of experts illustrated their hope to circumvent parliament. Yet, the attempt 
to rebuildfrom within reflected this business sector's approach to politics. 
In the cabinet reshuffling after the putsch, Cuno still assumed he would 
become finance minister. Not until 27 March did Cuno inform Ebert, 
Schiffer, Albert and Bauer that he would not participate because he thought 
the unions' position had become too strong. 89 
An important Herrenabend discussed the consequences of the Kapp 
Putsch in early April1920. 90 The relations of the industrial-military complex 
to the Weimar state were well illustrated. The participants appeared to be 
a mixture of the old and new cabinets: Muller, Schiffer, Seeckt, Groener, 
Gessler, Albert, Noske, Warburg. Holtzendorff first reported his lengthy 
talk with Gessler "who is completely of our opinion" that it was necessary 
to be mild with the officers who had participated in the putsch. "Confi-
dentially Gessler informed me that the treatment of putsch participants 
had been the main reason he took the extraordinarily difficult and thankless 
post of Reichswehr minister." With Seeckt Holtzendorff also discussed 
the putsch and Cuno's reasons for not entering the ministry. "Of course I 
found complete understanding". Gessler had asked Holtzendorff to bridge 
the gap between Noske and Seeckt : 
Naturally I shall attempt to make amends between these two first-rate men ... 
Happily Noske and Gessler work together excellently . Noske lives in his old 
apartment and he and Gessler meet daily and Gessler frequently gets advice 
from him. That can only be applauded . The Social Democratic undersecretary 
who was attached, or more accurately forced onto Gessler, has been given a 
room in Noske's apartment and by this purely local arrangement a certain 
amount of working together behind the scenes is possible. 
To Muller, the new Chancellor, Holtzendorff outlined Cuno's intentions 
for his trip to the United States. "He agreed [Cuno] could be exceptionally 
87 Ibid . 
88 Compare G. D. FELDMAN , " Big Business and the Kapp Putsch", Central 
European History, IV (1971) : 99ff., and E. K6NNEMANN, ed ., Arbeiterklasse siegt iiber 
Kapp-Liittwitz, 2 vols (Berlin : Auvemmann , 1971), 1: 26ff. on the role of heavy industry. 
89 Holtzendorff XX, Cuno to Ebert, 27 March 1920 ; on 23 March Bauer had again 
offered Cuno the finance ministry. 
90 Holtzendorff III and IV , Holtzendorff to Cuno, 12 April 1920, for the following 
citations and information. 
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useful in America just now and perhaps his influence ... could compensate 
for not taking the finance ministry." Holtzendorff's salon provided an 
essential link between government officials and light industry. 
The Herrenabende provide numerous examples in which government 
officials and cabinet members discussed and exchanged advice on pressing 
questions. In addition to the amount of information leaked here, conspi-
cuous is the casual assumption that all present shared a common purpose. 
The "unspoken assumption" of serving a "higher" national purpose had a 
dual aspect: the necessity of making a common front against the Entente 
and the concern to revive the German economy. 91 These assumptions 
surfaced infrequently but they played a key role in bringing and keeping 
the discussion partners together. The relations between Cuno and Ebert, 
which Holtzendorff cemented, illustrate this motivation. In September 
1920 Cuno spent two days with Ebert, who was holidaying in Freudenstadt, 
to report on a business trip to South Germany: 
I was together with Ebert and the Wiirttemberg representative Hildenbrandt 
who both were extraordinarily happy about the shippers' attempts to combine 
Hanseatic and South German interests. On 3 September, Ebert 000 let himself 
be informed in detail on the merchant fleet and our interests. He stated his 
agreement in the compensation question 00. He promised his support. He 
showed a special understanding for the necessity to achieve an economic re-
vival, to put aside all party-political differences and to join together all forces 
desirous of rebuilding the economy. 92 
Similarly, when Cuno heard that Ebert might not run for election to the 
presidency Cuno wrote him: 
At a time when the Reich can only regain its health if all work untiringly 00. 
and it appears to be impracticable in the long run that the Social Democrats 
are not in the cabinet, then certainly it must be avoided that the last tie between 
the bourgeois parties and Social Democracy falls 00. Therefore I direct this 
urgent appeal to you not to deny the fatherland. 93 
Ebert answered with a review of the Reich's difficulties and the assertion 
that "a way has to be found out of the plight of our country. The first pre-
condition is that the bourgeois parties recognize that the issue is not the 
form of the state but rather our economic and financial survival." 94 Fre-
quently at the Herrenabende, this concern about the well-being, even a 
re-established "great-power" position of the Reich, simmered through the 
discussions. 95 
91 The concept was developed by James JoLL, in his study of war origins, 1914: 
The Unspoken Assumptions (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). On the identification 
of businessmen with the general welfare, see also FELDMAN, "The Social and Economic 
Policies", p. 47. 
92 Holtzendorff XXI, Cuno notes from September 1920. 
93 Cuno Politik 1919-22, Cuno to Ebert, 22 September 1920. 
94 Ibid. , Ebert to Cuno, 14 October 1920, also printed in Friedrich Ebert 1871-1925 
(Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1971), pp. 155ff. 
95 Examples in Holtzendorff V and VI, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 16 October 1920, or 
19 December 1920, or 9 September 1921. During the crisis of September 1923 Ebert talked 
to Holtzendorff about a possible war of revenge against France (Holtzendorff XXIII, 
Holtzendorff to Hapag directory, 8 September 1923). 
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Information, contacts and even advice cannot be equated with in-
fluence. Although a prominent participant at the round table wrote to his 
wife in 1921, "this evening Holtzendorff's , which always means a small 
cabinet session", 96 Holtzendorff's political salon never amounted to a 
secret, second cabinet. Otherwise its termination could not have been so 
abrupt in early 1924. It served as a convenient place for the elite among 
the middle-of-the-road coalition partners to trade ideas, opinions and 
occasionally make plans. With fine wines and good cigars the shipping 
firm made its presence felt, evidently, because the shippers and the govern-
ment mutually assumed they needed each other. Patriotic and political 
assumptions united leaders who thought that their tactic - externally 
co-operating with Britain and the United States, internally revitalizing a 
capitalist economy - would restore German great-power stature in 
Europe. Thus Holtzendorff stated, convincingly and logically from this 
perspective, about the conversation in which Ebert spoke of a war of 
revenge during the Ruhr crisis of 1923: "one must be grateful that one 
has in the highest position of the Reich such a man who is undoubtedly 
patriotic through and through, very clever and calm and will certainly do 
everything on his part to save the situation." 97 
The information to which Holtzendorff had access provides insight 
into the functioning of the Weimar Republic. Significant is the circle of 
contacts, agreements and arrangements revealed to be in operation here. 
The coalescing and cohesion of what has been termed the Weimar "mid-
dle" -that element which disintegrated in the later stages of the republic 
- as a state-supporting element (including parts of industry, bureaucracy 
and military) separate and distinct from far Left and far Right political 
parties, from heavy industry and unions, can be followed in this political 
salon. Holtzendorff's table served as a prime meeting place for the decisive 
leaders of this political tendency. 
As a lobbyist Holtzendorff served his firm well. His salon, contacts 
and advice-giving illustrate the mechanism by which large-scale economic 
interests can adjust, alter and subtly affect policy through government 
officials. The usual means of briefs and cartel representation to politicians 
and ministries were here supplemented by a political salon. But the man 
to whom Holtzendorff primarily reported, Cuno, illustrated by his career 
that lobbying could be a two-way street. From an aloof co-operator at 
war's end prepared to offer deals to the government to attain the shippers' 
ends, he increasingly became tied to the Weimar system. He eventually 
served as Chancellor in 1922 on the assumption that governmental and 
business interests could be combined. 98 After a mediocre performance he 
96 Washington, National Archives, Papers of General Hans von Seeckt, Reel 28, 
Letters to his wife, 14 April 1921. 
97 Holtzendorff XXIII , Holtzendorff to Hapag directory, 8 September 1923. 
98 In 1917 Ballin had written to Holtzendorff: "It would be a shame for your Abende 
if the false impression arose that they did not serve national concerns as opposed to private 
interests. Both aims are easily capable of being combined". Cited in CECIL, Albert Ballin , 
p. 253 . During February 1919 when Holtzendorff wrote Cuno regarding the use of Hapag 
ships to transport foodstuffs , he mentioned that in speaking with the government the 
Hapag was not putting top priority upon its own interests. 
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continued to serve the state in attempting to arrange a currency system in 
November 1923 and a year later he seriously considered the post of ambas-
sador to the United States. 99 He had been so drawn into the state system 
that he risked a clash with his own firm. Cuno's career reminds one of 
others from leading sectors of industry: Rathenau, Wiedfeldt, Raumer, 
Stresemann. Thereby a decisive difference - largely unexplored by 
historians but underscored by the Holtzendorff documents - between the 
early (1919-23) and later (1929-33) crisis years of Weimar may be emphasiz-
ed: in the later crisis no men of this stature from the business community 
committed themselves to the responsibilities of public office. 100 Holtzen-
dorff's political salon, serving as a combination of interest representation 
and political integration, contributed in keeping alive the precarious "mid-
dle" in a republic where power remained divided among the state, the 
military, the bureaucracy, the unions, the parties and the diverging sectors 
of industry. 101 
In a larger perspective the utilization of a political salon as a lobbying 
instrument by an industrial concern is part of a broader social develop-
ment. Political salons, as forums for ideas and opinions on current events, 
have a long history. Their emergence paralleled the rise of political 
parties within which small groups frequently built a special circle. Such 
groups occasionally took the form of a salon, or, through the insight of 
such gracious outsiders as Madame de Stael, places were provided where 
different views could be debated without public scrutiny. With the simul-
taneous rise to societal pre-eminence, inter-penetration and interdependence 
of big business and giant state during the last hundred years, powerful 
economic interests have sought to influence most political groups including 
salons, or have resorted to financing their own. Holtzendorff's round table 
represents one mechanism in a variety, ranging from special pleading to 
bribery, from party financing to detailed briefs, employed to keep the state 
aware of big business' economic and political interests. 
The man who operated so adroitly behind the scenes of the early 
Weimar Republic had his own estimation of this situation and his salon. 
In October 1919 Holtzendorff declined an offer to be elected to the Reichstag 
for "in consideration of my present position, which is to provide a neutral 
ground for all parties, I must be doubly cautious and not gain attention 
in any way but rather remain 'one of the quiet ones in the land'.'' 102 
99 Cuno Politik 1923-30, Stresemann to Cuno, 11 December 1924. 
100 A comparison might be made with individuals such as P. Moldenauer, 
H. Warmbold or H. Dietrich. It could be posited that these men sought primarily to use 
the state to uphold the economy after 1929, while the earlier individuals were concerned 
to uphold the state. 
101 According to a high official in the Foreign Office, the following had to be con-
sulted or considered on every question : " cabinet, party leaders , industry, unions and press" . 
Politisches Archiv des Auswiirtigen Amtes, Bonn, Brockdorff-Rantzau Nachlass 14/1, 
Maltzan to Brockdorff-Rantzau, 26 April 1923 . 
102 Holtzendorff III and IV, Holtzendorff to Cuno, 10 October 1919. 
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RESUME. 
Au lendemain de Ia revolution allemande de 1918-19, les elites tradition-
nelles ont reussi a conserver leurs positions sociales et politiques. Nous etayerons 
ici cette esquisse devenue classique en examinant I' un des vehicules qu' a utilise 
un secteur des milieux d'affaires pour se faire entendre dans les cercles gouver-
nementaux. Dans le salon politique de Holtzendorff, des pressions subtiles etaient 
exercees sur des personnalites politiques triees sur le valet; ces pressions ont 
largement benejicie a Ia Societe de navigation Hapag , qui jinan~ait de telles acti-
vites mondaines. Par contre, et de fa~on assez inattendue, les representants du 
monde des affaires ont ainsi ere entralnes dans les rouages de Ia vie politique, de 
sorte que ce salon a, de fait, facilite /' integration d' elites disparates a Ia jeune 
Republique de Weimar. 
